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INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1937  
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RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000638

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,  
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)  
NSC FOR LUTES  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [OPCW](#) [CWC](#) [LY](#)  
SUBJECT: CWC: LIBYA'S REQUEST TO EXTEND THEIR DESTRUCTION  
DEADLINE AT EC-58

REF: A. THE HAGUE 632  
[1](#)B. STATE 100809

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-65-09

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. (C) The Libyan request to extend their intermediate and final deadlines for the destruction of their declared chemical weapons (CW) was approved by the Executive Council (EC) on October 16, but only after questions were raised privately by the U.S. and the UK, and publicly by the European Union (EU). The Technical Secretariat (TS) expressed grave doubts to U.S. and UK delegates about Libya's commitment to destroy its chemical weapons, a clear indication that continuing scrutiny of Libya's actions will remain necessary.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Details of the Council deliberations and sidebar meetings follow.

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EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DISCUSSION  
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[1](#)3. (SBU) The Libyan request for extension of the intermediate and final deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 CW (EC-58/NAT.5) was considered and approved during the Council's 58th Session (October 13-16) after scrutiny and discussion in the plenary session and on the margins. The EU joint statement during general debate called for "clear and unambiguous information about Libyan plans, intentions and projections for CW destruction." Upon introduction of the agenda item, Iran intervened to voice concern with the deadline extension request and

demanded that this be the "final, final" extension. The Libyan delegation prepared an addendum to the original request which included additional information to satisfy the Council members' concerns. The EC approved the deadline extension request following distribution of this additional paper.

¶4. (C) DEL COMMENT: Delrep Smith, UK Delegate Wolstenholme and Italian Delegate Cornacchia discussed the notion of an EU statement on the Libyan request on September 28, concluding that this approach would be more effective than verbal opposition from individual member states, particularly in light of limited attention from WEOG members on the topic in advance of the EC. The EU's public joint position forcibly strengthened the continuing private dialogue on transparency measures which the U.S. and the UK have had with Libyan representatives. END COMMENT.

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U.S.-UK-LIBYA TRILATERAL  
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¶5. (SBU) On October 13, the Libyan, U.S. and UK delegations held a trilateral meeting on the margins of EC-58 to discuss the Libyan deadline extension request and attention to transparency measures called for in U.S. and UK non-papers on the subject (ref B). Delreps Smith, Weekman and Peterson and UK Delegates Clive Rowland, James

Harrison and James McGilly met with Libyan Delegates Ahmed Hassan Walid, Tajouri Sharradi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed El-Hesnawy and M. Tamtam Abulkasam of the National Committee for the CWC in Tripoli.

¶6. (SBU) The U.S. and UK delegations stressed that they both would require continued transparency measures in return for supporting the Libyan extension request, such as releasing the destruction informals briefing, providing hardcopy reports including photos of the destruction facility progress and meeting with the U.S and the UK in advance of future OCPW meetings. Delrep requested a copy of the narrative statement delivered at the destruction informals the previous afternoon which Hesnawy provided to meeting participants. UK delegates further requested a national paper to be released during EC-58 outlining the rationale and progress plans behind the specific deadline extension request. Hesnawy agreed and produced a paper later in the week in the form of an addendum to the original deadline extension request (EC-58/NAT.5 Add.1). Hesnawy also stated that Libya is open to TS site visits to the destruction facility and temporary holding area to provide transparency, but he expressed frustration with the TS and disparaged the TS's capability. Hesnawy also mentioned the possibility of bilateral or trilateral visits by the U.S. and/or UK.

¶7. (SBU) Hesnawy admitted that three EC members had asked him to extend Libya's deadline request to 2012, but he insisted that consultations with contractors -- including the Italian firm SIPSA -- indicated that the requested deadline of mid-2011 already includes 4.5 months of contingency time. Requesting an extension to 2012 at this point would "insult" the contractors.

¶8. (SBU) On the deadline extension request, Hesnawy explained that Libya needed an extension to the destruction deadline because Libya had underestimated how long it would take to deal with

local and environmental protests to the Rabta destruction facility. However, as of September 25, the Libyan government had resolved the issues raised by protesters through a series of awareness workshops and negotiations on parameters for transporting the agent and precursors from the temporary holding area to the destruction facility.

¶9. (SBU) Responding to a question on the temporary holding area and precursor destruction, Hesnawy stated that the corroded tanks which cannot be safely transported to Rabta destruction facility will be hydrolyzed on site either in a stainless steel reactor or in a holding basin. Libya may also begin destroying Category 2 precursors on site early next year.

¶10. (SBU) After reloading the sulfur mustard, there is 2200 kg of heel left in plastic 20L containers. Libya intends to incinerate the entire containers in a rotating solid waste furnace rather than remove the heel.

¶11. (SBU) On the construction of the Rabta destruction facility, the Libyan delegation stated that the construction schedule outlined in the destruction informals allows for a delay of 1-2 weeks. Destruction must start in November 2010, however, according to Hesnawy. Ninety-five percent of the units for the destruction facility are

coming from Italy and will be pre-assembled. The incinerator, which has yet to be ordered from Germany, will be assembled on site. The incinerator will take 6 months to be delivered from the time of order. Hesnawy said that he had spent considerable time reviewing shipping options, stating that the vast majority of items will be shipped from Italy to Tripoli, but that arrangements at an alternative harbor were already completed as a back-up option.

¶12. (SBU) As to the conversion of the production facility, Hesnawy stated that the Rabta conversion project is on time, and he expects the TS to verify conversion in late December.

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TS IMPRESSIONS  
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¶13. (SBU) On October 15, the U.S. and UK delegations met with TS representatives to discuss the state of Libyan efforts to destroy its CW destruction stockpile. Delreps Smith, Weekman and Peterson and UK Delegate McGilly met with Horst Reeps (Director of Verification), Dominique Anelli (Head of Chemical Demilitarization Branch), Yaugen Ryzhyka (Senior Chem-Demil Officer) and Susan Atego (Senior Policy Officer).

¶14. (C) Reeps showed pictures from the TS visits to Rabta in April and July 2009. He clearly was concerned about Libya's lack of serious effort to destroy its CW stockpile and was unsure whether Libya will be able to meet the self-imposed deadline of November 1, 2010, for starting CW destruction. According to the TS, currently there is no infrastructure or equipment yet in place at the CW destruction facility.

¶15. (C) Anelli reported that every time TS representatives meet with Libyan officials -- in contrast to Libyan meetings with U.S. and UK officials -- they begin with a political statement along the lines of "Libya agreed to give up its WMD program in December 2003 and received absolutely

nothing in return from the U.S. and the UK; why do we need to disarm?" The statements imply, but stop short of saying, that Libya will retain its CW stockpile. In a January 2009 statement to the TS, the Head of the Libyan National Authority stated that only Libya is sticking up for the Palestinians. He accused the Europeans in the room of doing nothing to help the Palestinians and said that there is a lack of interest in Libya to destroy its CW stockpile on time. Delreps asked for a copy of the Libyan statements, but TS officials replied that there are no written copies as the Libyans only deliver verbal statements.

¶16. (C) Reeps suggested that the German and Italian delegations might be able to work with local commercial contractors employed on the Libyan destruction activity, who could potentially provide contractual data, procurement records and shipping transactions. This would allow for greater transparency into prospects for Libya meeting their new deadline.

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DEL COMMENT  
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¶17. (C) Libya may have hoped that in the distraction of the Executive Council's selection

of a new Director-General, consideration of the OPCW's budget and other issues (ref A), and by sending the fast-talking Dr. Hesnawy to make the case, they might get a pass on their extension request. They did not. Most Council members considered that Libya is not yet at the final deadline (April 2012) set in the Convention and were willing to allow more time for the completion of destruction. However, the European Union's skeptical stand provided a reality check in the Council, and reinforced private efforts by the U.S. and the UK to insist on transparency and progress on the ground. Del hopes that the Libyan government will begin to live up to its promises.

¶18. (U) BEIK SENDS.

LEVIN